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PERPETUITIES AND UNREASONABLE

INTRODUCTION

This paper will address four contractual provisions that often come
into play in the acquisition and disposition of oil and gas properties:
preferential rights to purchase, maintenance of uniform interest, areas
of mutual interest, and consents required for assignment.
These provisions each address valid commercial purposes and when
consciously and deliberately implemented, can reflect a negotiated allocation of value and risk among the parties to the various agreements
where they are found. However, they are all long-lived, if not perpetual, and at some point when performance of, or compliance with,
them is at issue, it will be in the interest of one party or a successor in
interest that the provisions either not apply or not be enforced. Thus,
t
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there is a constant testing of the boundaries in the commercial arena
and frequent legal challenges in the courts.
Each of these four provisions share certain elements with others, so
that common legal principles and bodies of law are relevant in establishing the boundaries and evaluating the inevitable challenges. Preferential rights to purchase and areas of mutual interest contemplate
future vesting which implicates the Rule Against Perpetuities. Preferential rights, the maintenance of uniform interest provision, and consents as conditions to assignment are restraints on alienation which
involve the common law Rule Against Unreasonable Restraints on
Alienation. All of these provisions purport to burden real property,
so that the Statute of Frauds and the law regarding "covenants running with the land" are relevant. This paper will not cover all of these
issues in depth, but will attempt to identify relevant Texas cases that
directly bear on the current status of these provisions.
I.

PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS TO PURCHASE

Whether called a preferential right to purchase, a preemptive right,
first option, or any other name, the holder of the right essentially can
preempt a sale to a third party by stepping forward and matching the
price. This right differs from an option in that the holder cannot force
a sale, but merely has the right to match the price if the seller decides
to sell. Even though these type provisions may be used less frequently
now than in the past,' they are encountered frequently enough to be
an issue in virtually every sale of producing properties.
The use of this kind of provision by co-owners of oil and gas properties seems to be the product of two basic motives. First, the co-owners
want to control who joins them in the financial and operational decisions and activities that go with owning and operating the properties.
Second, the co-owners want to have a chance at increasing their holdings in the contract area if the properties are offered for an attractive
price. If a party views itself as less likely to sell than the other parties,
having the right to match the top offer for each purchase of an interest
in the properties can be of value. However, the provisions can also
have the effect of reducing the value of the properties to all owners.
The reduction in value is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify, but if
nothing else, the transaction costs that arise from complying with or
attempting to circumvent the provisions must be paid. Further, the
presence of preferential rights tends to chill the interest of potential
1. An indicator of the current disfavored status of the preferential right is reflected by the treatment given the provision in the 1989 edition of the American Association of Petroleum Landmen Model Form Operating Agreement. In all prior
editions, the preferential right was part of the form and if the parties did not want the

provision in the agreement, they were required to strike it. In the 1989 form, the
provision (Art. VIII.F) has a box beside it and will not constitute part of the agreement unless the parties take the affirmative act of checking the box.
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purchasers, which may be reflected in fewer bidders and lower offers
when it comes time to sell.
Preferential rights to purchase are typically found in joint operating
agreements, occasionally in other agreements affecting joint ownership arrangements, and even in oil and gas leases. While the specific
language of the instrument granting or reserving the preferential right
to purchase is of paramount importance in determining the applicability and effect of the provision in a specific transaction, the most commonly encountered provision is the one contained in the American
Association of Petroleum Landmen ("AAPL") Model Form Operat-

ing Agreement. The preferential right provision contained in the
1956,2 1977 and 1982,1 and 19894 editions of the AAPL Model Form
2. The preferential right provision contained in the 1956 AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement reads as follows:
Should any party desire to sell all or any part of its interests under this contract, or its rights and interests in the Unit Area, it shall promptly give written notice to the other parties, with full information concerning its proposed
sale, which shall include the name and address of the prospective purchaser
(who must be ready, willing and able to purchase), the purchase price, and
all other terms of the offer. The other parties shall then have an optional
prior right, for a period of ten (10) days after receipt of the notice, to
purchase on the same terms and conditions the interest which the other
party proposes to sell; and, if this optional right is exercised, the purchasing
parties shall share the purchased interest in the proportions that the interest
of each bears to the total interest of all purchasing parties. However, there
shall be no preferential right to purchase in those cases where any party
wishes to mortgage its interests, or to dispose of its interests by merger, reorganization, consolidation, or sale of all of its assets, or a sale or transfer of its
interests to a subsidiary or parent company, or subsidiary of a parent company, or to any company in which any one party owns a majority of the
stock.
A.A.P.L. FORM 610-MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT § 18 (Am. Ass'n Petroleum Landmen 1956).
3. The preferential right provision contained in the 1977 and 1982 AAPL Model
Form Operating Agreements reads as follows:
Should any party desire to sell all or any part of its interests under this
agreement, or its rights and interests in the Contract Area, it shall promptly
give written notice to the other parties, with full information concerning its
proposed sale, which shall include the name and address of the prospective
purchaser (who must be ready, willing and able to purchase), the purchase
price, and all other terms of the offer. The other parties shall then have an
optional prior right, for a period of ten (10) days after receipt of the notice,
to purchase on the same terms and conditions the interest which the other
party proposes to sell; and, if this optional right is exercised, the purchasing
parties shall share the purchased interest in the proportions that the interest
of each bears to the total interest of all purchasing parties. However, there
shall be no preferential right to purchase in those cases where any party
wishes to mortgage its interests, or to dispose of its interests by merger, reorganization, consolidation, or sale of all or substantially all of its assets to a
subsidiary or parent company[,] or to a subsidiary of a parent company, or to
any company in which any one party owns a majority of the stock.
A.A.P.L. FORM 610-MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT art. VIII(F) (Am.
Ass'n Petroleum Landmen 1982) (amending art. VIII(G) 1979) (emphasis added).
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Operating Agreement are reproduced in the footnotes with the

changes from one edition to the next "italicized" to show the changes
that were made. The evolution of the AAPL Model Form preferential
right provision revealed by the marked changes identifies some of the
controversial issues that have arisen over the years.
A. Triggering the Right
Typically, a pending "sale" triggers the right of the holder of a preferential right to acquire the interest that is being marketed. Gifts and
transfers resulting from the death of the owner either by will or intestate succession are clearly outside the coverage of the provision. But
if value is given, a serious evaluation of the applicability of the preferential right provision should be undertaken. The AAPL Operating
Agreement actually encourages an expansive reading of the term
"sale" by including an express carve-out for mortgages. How broad

exclumust one's definition of "sale" be in order to need an express
5
sion of something as antithetical to a sale as is a mortgage?

1. Leases, Subleases, and Farmouts
While there is not a lot of authority, the case of Cherokee Water Co.

6 suggests that virtually any transfer for value will be a
v. Forderhause

"sale." In that case, the Texas Supreme Court held that the granting

4. The "Preferential Right to Purchase Provision" appearing in the 1989 edition
of the AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement is as follows:
Should any party desire to sell all or any part of its interests under this agreement, or its rights and interests in the Contract Area, it shall promptly give
written notice to the other parties, with full information concerning its pro-'
posed disposition, which shall include the name and address of the prospective transferee (who must be ready, willing and able to purchase), the
purchase price, a legal description sufficient to identify the property, and all
other terms of the offer. The other parties shall then have an optional prior
right, for a period of ten (10) days after the notice is delivered, to purchase
for the stated consideration on the same terms and conditions the interest
which the other party proposes to sell; and, if this optional right is exercised,
the purchasing parties shall share the purchased interest in the proportions
that the interest of each bears to the total interest of all purchasing parties.
However, there shall be no preferential right to purchase in those cases
where any party wishes to mortgage its interests, or to transfer title to its
interests to its mortgagee in lieu of or pursuantto foreclosure of a mortgage of
its interests, or to dispose of its interests by merger, reorganization, consolidation, or by sale of all or substantially all of its Oil and Gas assets to any
party, or by transfer of its interests to a subsidiary or parent company or to a
subsidiary of a parent company, or to any company in which such party owns
a majority of the stock.
A.A.P.L. FORM 610-MODEL FORM OPERATING AGREEMENT art. VIII(F) (Am.
Ass'n Petroleum Landmen 1989) [hereinafter MODEL FORM] supra (emphasis added).
5. Even though deeds of trust bear some superficial resemblance to conveyances,
they are merely security devices. See Carroll v. Edmondson, 41 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex.
1931) ("A mortgage of real property is not regarded as a commonlaw conveyance on
condition, but merely as security for debt.
6. 641 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. 1982).
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of an oil and gas lease was a "sale" that triggered a preferential right
to purchase.7 The preferential right was created in a deed that conveyed the surface to Cherokee Water Co. and reserved the minerals to
the plaintiff's predecessor in title.' Cherokee Water Co. also was
granted the "first option to purchase the oil, gas and other minerals
herein reserved, at the same price and on the same terms as Grantor
has agreed to sell to a third party."9 The Texas Supreme Court characterized the oil and gas lease as the "sale" of a fee simple determinable and held that it triggered the preferential right.' °
A different result was reached in the case of Panuco Oil Leases, Inc.
v. Conroe Drilling Co." with regard to a "drill to earn" arrangement.
A transaction through which the operator earned additional interests
in oil and gas leases by bearing the cost of deepening a well was determined not to be a "sale," as that term was used in the agreement creating the preferential right and, therefore, was not covered by the
preferential right provision. 2 Since the Panuco opinion is not easily
reconciled with the Forderhauseopinion and has never been cited in
any other decision, it is difficult to give much weight to it.
2.

Overriding Royalties

There is authority for the transfer of an overriding royalty triggering
a preferential right to purchase. In the case of IMCO Oil & Gas Co.
v. Mitchell Energy Corp.," the preferential right in an operating
agreement was held to be triggered by the sale of an overriding royalty by Mr. L.C. Kung. 1 4 The subject overriding royalty had previously been conveyed to Mr. Kung by Westland Oil Development Co.
subsequent to Westland's execution of the operating agreement containing the preferential right provision.' 5 The plaintiff, IMCO, was
the buyer under a purchase agreement covering both Westland's
working interest and Mr. Kung's overriding royalty. 6 Mitchell Energy exercised its preferential right. 7 IMCO challenged the exercise
7. See id. at 525.
8. See id. at 524.
9. Forderhause v. Cherokee Water Co., 623 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 641 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. 1982).
10. Cherokee Water Co., 641 S.W.2d. at 525 ("The common oil and gas lease creates a determinable fee. It vests the lessee with title to oil and gas in place .... It
logically follows, and has long been held by this court, that an oil and gas lease is a
sale of an interest in land.") (citations omitted).
11. 202 F. Supp. 108 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
12. Id. at 114 ("The... agreements.., providing for the exchange of interests in
consideration of ... agreement to drill the well deeper were not 'sales' within the
contemplation of the option or right of refusal clause . . . of the Farm-Out
Agreement.").
13. 911 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
14. See id. at 921.
15. See id. at 918.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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on multiple bases, including the inapplicability of the preferential
right to the overriding royalty.18
The court upheld Mitchell's summary judgment on all points, including the holding that the transfer of the overriding royalty was subject to the preferential right, giving weight to an unspecified provision
in the operating agreement: "The very terms of the 1972 Operating
Agreement expressly provided that any overriding royalty interest
created by a party would be subject to the terms of the agreement." 19
Presumably, the provision referred to is the "subsequently created interest" provision in the 1989 edition of the AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement, which does not specifically address the coverage of
the preferential right provision to subsequently created overriding
royalties, but does address the interplay between subsequently created
overriding royalties and the operator's lien, the non-consent penalty,
and mandatory
assignments among the parties to the operating
20
agreement.
The application of the preferential right provision to the grant of an
overriding royalty and each subsequent conveyance of an overriding
royalty would have implications not only for all of those geologists
and employee royalty pools that are conveyed overriding royalties after an operating agreement is executed. This is also applicable to
many mezzanine lenders and pension funds for whom overriding royalties and "net profits overriding royalties" constitute part of the financing transaction.
3. Involuntary Sales 2
The leading case dealing with the applicability of a preferential right
to a foreclosure sale is Draper v. Gochman.22 In this case, the preferential right, which was contained in a real estate sublease, provided
that if the lessee "desires to sell or dispose of his interest," the sublessee shall have the preferential right to buy the leasehold. 23 The lessee
18. See id. at 919.
19. Id. at 921 (noting that "[a]s an assignee of Westland, therefore, the Kung over-

ride was subject to the preferential right provision of the 1972 Operating
Agreement").
20. MODEL FORM, supra note 4.
21. See Gary B. Conine, Property Provisions of the Operating AgreementInterpretation, Validity, and Enforceability, 19 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1263 (1988).
Professor Conine states: "The majority of decisions on the subject appear to conclude

that the preferential right to purchase does not apply to 'involuntary' sales." Id. at
1318 (citing J.F. Ghent, Annotation, Rights of Holder of First Refusal Option on Real
Property in the Event of Sale at Foreclosure or Other Involuntary Sale, 17 A.L.R.3d
962, § 2 (1968)). None of the decisions discussed in this annotation deal with the
AAPL language. Most of them seem to turn on "desires to sell" language similar to
the operative language in Draperv. Gochman, 400 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1966), discussed
infra.
22. 400 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. 1966).
23. See id. at 545 (emphasis added).
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mortgaged its interest, which was subsequently sold at foreclosure. a
The court held that the preferential right was not applicable to the
foreclosure sale.25 The court viewed the "desires to sell" language as
precluding application of the preferential right to an involuntary sale.
Because of the emphasis the court placed on that phrase, it is not
clear how much comfort should be taken from the Drapercase when
dealing with the AAPL language or other preferential right language
that requires a "sale" but does not have language tipping the scales
away from involuntary sales. Certainly, the Forderhause case discussed above would suggest that a "sale is a sale," and, further, that
some transfers not generally referred to as sales are also sales.2 6 The
express exclusion of mortgages from the AAPL 1956,27 1977 and
198228 editions, without any exclusion for foreclosure sales provides
an argument that foreclosure sales are sales that trigger the preferential right. The addition of express carveouts for foreclosure sales and
deeds in lieu of foreclosures in the 198929 edition suggests that the
AAPL drafting committee perceived some question regarding the status of foreclosure sales under prior editions.
4. Multi-Property Packages
The application of preferential rights to multi-property sales is discussed in more detail below, but the threshold issue of whether the
inclusion of a property encumbered by a preferential right in a larger
sale triggers the preferential right requires some discussion. Certainly,
the most common approach to selling oil and gas properties is to package multiple properties for sale. Yet, after the passage of forty-two
years since the first AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement, three
subsequent iterations3 ° and thousands of committee man-hours, the
AAPL form does not acknowledge that package sales occur by expressly stating either that the preferential right does or does not apply
to such sales nor by addressing any of the other issues that arise in
multi-property sales. It has been suggested that the failure of the
model form provision to address multi-property sales reflects an intent
that the provision not cover them. 3 ' In view of the revisions that have
24. See id.
25. Id. at 548 ("Our holding is that the trustee sale here was not a voluntary sale
so as to give Gochman a preferential right to purchase.").
26. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
27. See supra note 2.
28. See supra note 3.
29. See supra note 4 ("[T]here shall be no preferential right to purchase in those
cases where any party wishes to mortgage its interests, or to transfer title to its interests to its mortgagee in lieu of or pursuant to foreclosure of a mortgage of its interests
30. See supra notes 2-4.
31. See Harry M. Reasoner, Preferential Purchase Rights in Oil and Gas Instruments, 46 TEX. L. REV.57, 72 n.10 (1968); Harlan Albright, PreferentialRight Provisions and Their Applicability to Oil and Gas Instruments, 32 Sw. L.J. 803, 816 (1978).
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been made in the AAPL preferential right language over the years,
including the detailed exclusions that have been added, the better argument may be that the AAPL committee knows how to draft exclusions. If any deduction follows from the absence of express treatment
of package sales, the conclusion should probably be that any intent to
exclude them would be expressly stated.
The preferential right burdening a single condominium was triggered by the sale of the entire condominium complex in Riley v.
Campeau Homes (Texas), Inc.3" However, the facts may limit the application of Riley. In that case, a tenant of a condominium had a preferential right to acquire the unit he lived in, and the owner of the unit
agreed to sell that unit together with other units in the condominium
project as a group. 33 The owner gave notice to the tenant of the proposed sale and the tenant exercised his preferential right. 34 After that
exchange, the seller took the position that the preferential right did
not apply to the bulk sale. 35 The seller's arguments that the right did
not apply to the sale were undermined by the fact that the seller gave
the holder of the preferential right notice of the sale and initially admitted that the preferential right was applicable and by provisions in
the sale contract dealing with the contingency of the holder of preferential rights exercising such rights. 36 Therefore, the precedential
value and persuasive effect may be limited if the seller and buyer do
not acknowledge the applicability of an outstanding preferential right.
5. Sales to Existing Co-Owners
There is no express language in the AAPL form provision that
would exclude a sale to a party who already owns an interest in the
contract area.3 7 If the sole purpose of a preferential right provision
was to exclude potential owners who do not have sufficient capital or
who are litigious or otherwise "not good partners," then the provision
would serve no purpose by preempting the sale of an interest to someone who already owns an interest in the contract area. This reasoning
seems to be the basis of the decision in Texas Co. v. Graf.38 In that

case, two co-tenants originally signed the document that created the
preferential rights. 39 Subsequently, there were three co-tenants, and
one of them contracted to buy out another of them.4" The third co32.
33.
34.
35.

808
See
See
See

S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd by agr.).
id. at 185.
id. at 186.
id. (noting that "[t]he seller asserted that the owner's right of first refusal

was not applicable to this sale because it was a 'bulk' sale involving other
properties").
36. See id. at 188.
37. See supra note 4.
38. 221 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

39. See id. at 865.
40. See id.
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tenant asserted his preferential right to participate in the acquisition.41
The court held that one co-tenant could sell to another without triggering the preferential right because the provision was meant only to
prevent the entry of outsiders.42
The case of Questa Energy Corp. v. Vantage Point Energy, Inc.4 3 was
decided on the same basis. In Questa, the appellate court upheld a
directed verdict against the holder of preferential rights, refusing to
apply the AAPL model form provision." The sole basis for holding
the preferential right to be inapplicable was that the properties encumbered by the preferential right were not transferred to an "outside
entity."45 The transferors of the properties were Oakwood Petroleum, Ltd., Oakwood Resources, Inc., and Oakwood Petroleum
46
Corp., all subsidiary corporations of Sceptre Resources Limited.
The transferee of the properties was Vantage Point Energy, Inc.,
which prior to the transaction owned no interest in the properties.47
The Agreement for Exchange of Properties and Securities (the "Exchange Agreement"), executed by and between Sceptre, the Sceptre
subsidiaries, and Vantage, called for the properties to be conveyed to
Vantage in exchange for a majority of the shares of common stock of
Vantage, a promissory note, and cash. 48 Even though Vantage was not
affiliated with Sceptre prior to the challenged transaction, initially the

court seemed intent on deciding the case under the "affiliate transaction" exception contained in the AAPL provision:
Our initial determination then must be whether the record establishes, as a matter of law, that the trial court's conclusion was correct. Fulfillment of that task requires us to interpret Article
VIII(G) of the operating agreement which provides that the preferential purchase right is not triggered by a party's disposal of its interests by merger, reorganization, consolidation, or sale of all or
substantially all of its assets to a subsidiary or parent company or to
a subsidiary of a parent company, or to any company in which any
one party owns a majority of the stock.4 9
41. See id.

42. See id. at 866. The court stated:
[Olne co-tenant has the right to sell to another co-tenant without notice to
the remaining co-owners and not violate the provisions of the written agreement. We further construe the agreement was made for the purpose of
granting to each co-owner an option to purchase the property of any other
co-owner before such property could be sold to a third party.
Id.

43. 887 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied).
44. See id. at 222.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 220.
47. See id.
48. See id.

49. Id. at 221.
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Since Vantage was not an affiliate of Sceptre prior to the Exchange
Agreement but, instead, received its stock ownership position in consideration for transferring the properties, it is difficult to construe the
transaction as being expressly excluded by the quoted portion of the
operating agreement. Instead of basing its decision on the quoted language, the court retreated from the express language of the provision
and reviewed the purposes of the preferential right provision:
In an operating agreement, the preferential right to purchase serves
two purposes. First, it assures its holder an opportunity to acquire
further interests in the contract area ....
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a preferential right to
purchase ensures that the owners retaining their interest in the contract area have some degree of control in excluding undesirable participants who may not have the necessary financial ability to bear
their share of expenditures or who might frustrate development
with management and engineering philosophies which current owners oppose ....
The structure and working of Article VIII(G) discloses the intent
of the parties to accomplish the two purposes discussed above. We
hold that the "interests" referred to in the contract are those held
by a party or parties to the contract. Prior to the transaction in
question, those interests were held by subsidiaries of Sceptre. The
effect of the transaction was simply to transfer those "interests" to
another entity controlled by Sceptre. That being so, the conveyance
was not made to an outside entity. Inasmuch as the interest Vantage received continues to be burdened with the preferential right
to purchase in the event of a sale to an outsider, Questa was not
exposed to the risk of "undesirable outsiders" holding the interest,
nor has it lost its potential opportunity in the event of Vantage's sale
or contemplated sale to an outsider. Thus, the trial court did not err
in rendering its directed verdict.5 °
If the reasoning of the Questa opinion is valid or authoritative, then
the revisions to expand the "affiliate transaction" exclusion contained
in the 1989 AAPL Model Form Agreement were unnecessary. Transfers among companies under common control would not be covered.
More significantly, the Questa court would apparently hold that the
preferential right provision is not triggered by any transfer of properties to an entity controlled by any party already owning interests in
the contract area. This would arguably include the sale of all of one
party's interest in the contract area to a co-owner, since no new owners (outsiders) are being introduced. While this construction does not
contravene the second purpose of preferential rights provisions, as
noted by the Questa opinion (i.e., excluding outsiders), it completely
ignores the first purpose cited by the court, which is to afford the hold50. Id. at 222 (citations omitted). The citations that were omitted from this

lengthy quotation were law review articles-no cases were cited.
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ers of the preferential right the opportunity to increase their ownership if interests are sold. 5 '
Query whether the Questa court would reach the same conclusion
as reached by the court in IMCO, which held that the preferential
right applied to the sale of an overriding royalty. 5 Since an overriding royalty interest is a non-operating interest, perhaps the ownership
of an overriding royalty by an "outsider" would not contravene the
intent of the preferential rights provision as interpreted in the Questa
opinion.
B.

Mechanics of Complying with PreferentialRights Provisions

The procedure for giving notice and responding to notices required
by preferential rights provisions will depend wholly on the language
employed in the relevant contractual provisions. The AAPL provision requires a notice setting forth the purchase price and all other
terms of the offer and the identification of the prospective purchaser,
who must be ready, willing and able to purchase. 53 Under this language, it is difficult to justify anything less than providing a copy of the
entire purchase agreement to the preferential right holder.
Requests for information by a preferential right holder or attempts
to negotiate alternative provisions should not constitute a rejection of
the offer or a waiver of the preferential right. However, only an exercise by the holder of his right to acquire the properties "on the same
terms and conditions" as agreed to by the buyer will preempt the
buyer's right to acquire the properties.
For example, in the case of Abraham Inv. Co. v. Payne Ranch,
Inc.," Mr. Campbell, the holder of a preferential right, executed a
letter presented to him evidencing his agreement to purchase a ranch
for the same cash price and otherwise on the same terms and conditions as offered by a potential purchaser.5 5 However, Mr. Campbell
persuaded the seller to finance a portion of the purchase price and the
51. See id.
52. See IMCO Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 911 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
53. In Henderson v. Nitschke, 470 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), the contract language provided "if Lessor receives from a third party
an acceptable bona fide offer ... Lessor shall forthwith give Lessee written notice
thereof ....

."

Id. at 411. Under this language, the preferential right ripens into an

enforceable right when the owner forms the intent to accept the offer. See also Peters
v. Smuggler-Durant Mining Corp., 910 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1995) affd 930 P.2d 575
(Colo. 1997). In Peters,the court held that the preferential right contained in a mining
lease was triggered by the "selling" party executing a non-binding expression of intent. See id. at 38 ("[W]hen a right of first refusal is involved, once the owners evidence an intent to sell the property, the right of first refusal is activated and converted
into an irrevocable option to purchase.").
54. 968 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, n.w.h.).
55. See id. at 522.
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ranch was sold on this basis.56 The potential purchaser sued the seller
and Mr. Campbell for specific performance. 57 The purchase agreement expressly provided that the buyer's right to buy the ranch was
subject to Mr. Campbell's preferential right. 8 The court held that the
potential purchaser's right to purchase the ranch was, however, subject to a proper exercise of the preferential right and that Mr. Campbell had not exercised the right. 59 The notice to Mr. Campbell
transformed his preferential right to an option and subjected Mr.
Campbell to the strict rules of options. He must accept or reject the
offer as made.
While the IMC0 6 ° case and authorities discussed therein indicate

that the preferential right holder's notice exercising the right must be
in strict compliance with the purchase offer, the notice to the preferential right holder triggering his decision may not be so closely scrutinized. The holder of the preferential right should not expect to use a
deficient notice as the basis for a subsequent assertion of rights if the
notification of the sale or other information puts the holder on notice
that the sale is taking place. If the holder is put "on inquiry" regarding a pending sale by any form of notice or information, rather than
"lay behind the log," he should make the appropriate inquiry and pursue his rights.61
On the other hand, if the sale that actually occurs is on substantially
different terms than were disclosed to the preferential right holder,
the right is not extinguished. In the case of Foster v. Bullard,62 after
the notice was given to the preferential right holder, the buyer assigned the purchase agreement to a third party. 63 After the assignment, the purchase agreement was amended.64 These developments
effectively opened the door for the preferential right holder to exercise his preferential right to purchase long after his 10-day option expired.65 Foster, 496 S.W.2d at 731.66 The court held that Mr. Foster's
56. See id. at 523.
57. See id. at 524.
58. See id. at 523.
59. See id. at 524.
60. IMCO Oil & Gas Co. v. Mitchell Energy Corp., 911 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
61. See Humphrey v. Wood, 256 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
62. 496 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. See id. at 726.
64. See id. at 727.
65. A time line setting forth the facts of this case will be helpful. On January 13,
1969, the purchase agreement between seller and Mr. Hendrix, the buyer, was executed. See id. at 731. The terms of the sale were (i) $650 per acre for 2,460 acres, or

$1,600,000, (ii) $25,000 earnest money, with another $135,000 cash at closing, with a
promissory note for the remainder at 5% interest, due in six months. See id. On the
same date, the notice to Mr. Foster, the preferential right holder, was sent (Mr. Foster
had 10 days to exercise the preferential right). See id. On July 25, 1969, Hendrix
assigned his rights under the purchase agreement to Mutual Savings Institution. See
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preferential right was not extinguished by the sale to Mutual: "The
sale Bullard had under consideration when he wrote Foster in January
of 1969 was a trade with Hendrix. This sale never took place. 6 7
While minor amendments should not require a second notice to the
preferential right holder, the requirement of the AAPL language that
the right holder be given "all . . . terms of the offer ' 68 provides a
holder the opening to challenge a sale that is not closed on the terms
that were disclosed to him. Since there is usually a flurry of issues that
arise immediately before (or during) the closing of the sale transaction, a written waiver from the preferential right holder is desirable
because it will give seller and buyer the freedom to make the necessary adjustments as the closing approaches. The waiver should be
broadly drafted to cover a sale from the seller to a specific buyer so
long as it closes before a specific date. A waiver that expressly or
implicitly covers only a sale on the exact terms initially disclosed to
the preferential right holder may document the fact that the holder
declined to exercise the preferential right but would not give any additional flexibility to alter terms of the deal. Without a written waiver
from the right holder, buyer and seller should be very reluctant to
modify the terms of sale after the notice has been sent to the holder.
C.

Same Terms and Conditions/Multi-PropertyPackages

The AAPL language, as well as most other preferential right provisions, requires a preferential right holder, in order to exercise its
rights, to step up and acquire the properties subject to the right "on
the same terms and conditions" as the prospective purchaser.6 9 Any
transaction that is structured other than as the sale of the encumbered
property for cash can raise commercial and legal issues in this area.
As soon as the buyer negotiates for some "seller financing" or the
id. Between July 25 and August 28, 1969, Bullard and Mutual amended the purchase
agreement to (i) change the due date on the promissory note from November 1, 1969,
to August 28, 1971, (ii) raise the interest rate on the note from 5% to 8.5% interest,
(iii) based on results of a survey, increase the acreage call from 2,460 acres to 2,487.07
acres and increase the purchase price by $650 per acre for the additional 27 acres. See
id. The sale was closed on August 28, 1969. See id. On September 22, 1969, Mr.
Hendrix read in the Austin newspaper that "Mutual Savings is paying $1.6 million for
a 2,500-acre ranch which touches the new West Loop in the hills southwest of town.
The seller: Lawyer and mortgage banker, Bill Bullard, who left Friday to vacation in
Rome and Athens. . . ." See id. Approximately six months after the closing, Mr.
Foster filed his lawsuit. See id.
66. Id. at 735.
67. See supra text accompanying note 4.
68. See id.

69. See Questa Energy Corp. v. Vantage Point Energy, Inc. 887 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1994, writ denied). By deciding that the preferential right did not
apply to the challenged transfer, the Questa court avoided dealing with the issue of
how the preferential right holder would match the unique nature of the consideration
to be paid, which included 81% of the outstanding shares of the acquiring corporation. See id. at 220.
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seller negotiates for an indemnity from the buyer, the creditworthiness of the buyer or, more fundamentally, the identity of the buyer
becomes an issue."v In particular, the comparison regarding the financial strength of the potential buyer versus the holder of the preferential rights is likely to arise in the sale of producing oil and gas
properties when the seller must rely on and give value to the buyer's
covenants, assumption of liabilities, and indemnities regarding plugging and abandonment, clean-up and remediation, gas balancing obligations, etc.
What the term "same terms and conditions"7 " means in a multiproperty acquisition is an especially difficult and controversial issue.
Often, the buyer is purchasing certain properties in a package that
have no particular attraction to it in order to obtain the properties
that are the object of the acquisition. The exercise of preferential
rights by third parties to purchase any of the "chaff" properties is of
no consequence to the buyer, but the removal of a key property because of a third party exercising a preferential right could make the
entire acquisition unattractive to the buyer. Consider the following
questions. Must the preferential right holder literally buy the whole
package, including the chaff, on the same terms and conditions as the
potential purchaser is willing to do? Does the holder of a preferential
right on a single property have the right to claim the whole package?7 2
Must the seller and potential buyer allocate a specific dollar amount
to an individual encumbered property?73 Can the seller discourage
the holder of a preferential right from exercising the right by planting
a "poison pill" in the purchase and sale agreement in the form of a
provision that is innocuous or tolerable to the potential purchaser but
which has more significant negative ramifications to the preferential
right holder?
The case that gives the most guidance in this area is West Texas
Transmission, L.P. v. Enron Corp.7 4 In this case, Valero had the preferential right to purchase an undivided one-half interest in a gas pipeline.75 The purchase agreement with a third party purchaser, TECO,
70. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

71. If there is more than one property subject to preferential rights, obviously two
different holders who exercise cannot both buy the whole package.
72. In Foster v. Bullard, 554 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin (1977) writ ref'd
n.r.e.), Mr. Foster successfully challenged the allocation of the purchase price to the
burdened tract as being artificially high. See id. at 71. The notice to Mr. Foster stated
that the sales price for the burdened tract was $3,000 per acre. See id. at 67. However, the contract provided for adjustments to the purchase price on the basis of $650
per acre if the survey of the land indicated the tract to contain more or less than the
2,460 acres specified in the contract. See id. at 68. This provision dealing with adjustments to the purchase price established the agreement of buyer and seller regarding
the price allocated to the 50-acre tract. See id. at 70.
73. 907 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1990).
74. See id. at 1556.
75. See id.
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established a cash purchase price, but also provided that the seller's
obligation to sell was conditioned on the Federal Trade Commission
approving the sale.76 Valero signed a letter exercising its preferential
right under "the same terms and conditions" as agreed to by the seller
and TECO.7 7 After the FTC had begun its scrutiny of the transaction,

Valero attempted to avoid the FFC approval process.78 At this point,
the seller executed a second agreement with TECO and the litigation
followed.7 9 Valero sought specific performance of the sale transaction
and asserted that it need only meet the price provisions of the
purchase agreement in order to exercise its preferential right. 80 The
Fifth Circuit held that a party exercising the preferential right must
meet all conditions agreed to by the buyer and may not simply match
the purchase price for the property subject to the preferential right:
Under language comparable to that used in that Enron/Valero
Ownership Agreement, the owner of property subject to a right of
first refusal remains master of the conditions under which he will
relinquish his interest, as long as those conditions are commercially
and not specifically designed to
reasonable, imposed in good 8faith,
1
defeat the preemptive rights.

The citations that follow the quoted language from the West Texas
Transmission case include only one Texas case, Holland v. Fleming,"
which does not support the requirement that the conditions submitted
to the preferential right holder must be commercially reasonable, imposed in good faith, or designed for purposes other than defeating the
preemptive rights. In view of the Fifth Circuit's reliance on non-Texas
cases and Texas's refusal to impose a duty of good faith in contracts
generally,83 the language quoted above from the West Texas Transmission case may not be authoritative.
The West Texas Transmission case actually dangles two alternative
bases for a preferential right holder to avoid compliance with nonprice provisions. First, the opinion requires the terms to be "commercially reasonable, imposed in good faith, and not specifically designed
to defeat the preemptive rights." 84 Then, after devoting considerable
attention to the requirement that the exercise of the preferential right
must meet the strict "unqualified, absolute, unconditional, unequivo76. See id. at 1557.
77. See id. at 1558.
78. See id.

79. See id. at 1561.
80. Id. at 1563 (citations omitted).
81. 728 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ denied).
82. See English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983) (stating that "[t]his concept
is contrary to our well-reasoned and long-established adversary system which has
served us ably in Texas for almost 150 years").
83. West Texas Transmission, 907 F.2d 1554, at 1563.

84. See id. at 1565.
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cal" requirement applicable to exercising options,8 5 the court acknowledges a limited exception for "those acceptances which contain
minor or insubstantial variations from the original offer."8 6 These insubstantial variations will not be fatal to the preferential right holder
under two conditions: if (i) the terms of sale "contain terms which are
peculiar to the relationship between the third party and the property
owner, and which the preemptive right holder could never satisfy,"
and (ii) if unique conditions within the terms of the sale "do not provide a reasonable basis for distinguishing between the two offers, raising the inference that the seller imposed those terms in bad faith to
defeat the option."8 7 While the West Texas Transmission opinion puts
these two criteria forth as tests for measuring responses from preferential right holders that are not in strict compliance with the terms of
the purchase offer, the court drifts back to a good faith test that is not
entirely distinguishable from the general requirement set forth earlier
for the validity of non-cash terms.8 8
In the case of Abraham Investment Co. v. Payne Ranch, Inc.,89 the
Amarillo Court of Appeals suggests the Fifth Circuit may not have
limited itself to Texas law in the West Texas Transmission case:
The Fifth Circuit Court in West Texas Transmission, L.P., based
upon a combination of Texas law and the law of other jurisdictions,
set out three exceptions to the unequivocal acceptance rule of option agreements. The exceptions provide that a seller may not impose an offer upon the rightholder that is commercially
unreasonable, that is offered in bad faith, and that is "specifically
designed to defeat" the preferential right. 90 However, after a careful reading of West Texas Transmission, L.P., we note that the Fifth
Circuit created these exceptions based in a large part upon the law
of other jurisdictions. Thus, rather than following these exceptions,
we will directly follow Texas law. 91 In the Jones case, the court explicated the general rule regarding equitable relief in such cases.
Equitable relief will be granted when the offeree failed to accept the
offer within an option agreement if such failure resulted from fraud,
surprise, accident, or mistake. 92 Equally, estoppel principles may
apply if the offeror's conduct prevented the offeree from properly
making his acceptance.

85. Id. at 1565-66.
86. See id. at 1566.
87. See id.
88. 968 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, n.w.h.).
89. Id. at 526-27 (citing West Texas Transmission, 907 F.2d at 1566-67).
90. Id. at 527 (citing Jones v. Gibbs, 130 S.W.2d at 271-72).
91. Id. (citing Jones, 130 S.W.2d at 272-73).

92. Id.
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D.

Stock Transactions

The first portion of the AAPL preferential right provision grants a
preferential right only if a party disposes of its interest in the contract
area.93 A party's "interest in the contract area" is an interest in oil
and gas leases, and a sale of stock by the shareholder of a party is not
a transfer of the party's interest in the contract area. Many factors
must be considered in structuring a transaction as a stock sale rather
than an asset sale, and avoiding preferential rights to purchase may be
a relatively small concern in comparison to other issues. However,
structuring transactions as stock sales rather than asset sales can prevent preferential rights provisions from disrupting sales.
An avoidance technique under the older AAPL model forms required the seller to form a wholly-owned subsidiary and then transfer
a package of properties into the subsidiary.9 4 The seller then sold the
stock of the subsidiary to the purchaser who is interested in the package of properties. The original transfer of the properties by the seller
to the newly formed subsidiary was in the nature of a "reorganization"
that was excluded from the model form preferential rights provision.
This is essentially the approach taken by Tenneco in connection
with the divestiture of some of its assets. In both Galveston Terminals,
Inc. v. Tenneco Oil Co.95 and Tenneco Inc. v. Enterprise Production
Co.9 6 these "two-step" transactions were held not to trigger the preferential right. In the Galveston Terminals case, the First District
Court of Appeals in Houston was willing to review "substance over
form" and denied summary judgment to Tenneco by recognizing fact
issues in the preferential right holder's recharacterization of the twostep transaction as a sale of assets:
The character of a legal transaction depends on the intent and
purpose of the parties. A contract regarding real property is construed as a whole. The courts will look to each and all of the parts
of the written instrument, as well as the surrounding circumstances,
to determine the intent and purpose of the parties. In order to ascertain the intention of the parties, all of the instruments that are
shown to be component parts of a single transaction should be read
together.97
However, this reasoning was expressly disapproved by the Texas
Supreme Court in Tenneco:
We expressly disapprove of the court's reasoning in Galveston
Terminals. Sound corporate jurisprudence requires that courts narrowly construe rights of first refusal and other provisions that effec93. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 2.
95. 904 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), set aside without reference to merits, 922 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1996).
96. 925 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1996).
97. Galveston Terminals, 904 S.W.2d at 791 (citations omitted).
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tively restrict the free transfer of stock. Viewing several separate
transactions as a single transaction to invoke the right of first refusal
compromises
the law's unfavorable estimation of such restrictive
98
provisions.

Enterprise, the preferential right holder, had used three arguments
and categories of evidence to attack the two-step transaction: (1) Tenneco had offered the properties as an asset sale before settling on the
stock sale approach, (2) press releases characterizing the transaction
as a sale by Tenneco of "its natural gas liquids business," and (3) evidence that both parties had treated the transaction as an asset sale
rather than a stock sale for tax purposes. 99 The documents effectuat-

ing the transaction determinatively established that it was a stock sale,
not an asset sale, and neither tentative early structuring, press releases, nor tax positions could alter the transaction documents. 100
E. Sales of Substantially All Assets

While the preferential rights provision contained in the 1989 version
of the model form excludes from its coverage a "sale of all or substantially all of [a party's] Oil and Gas assets to any party," 101 prior versions excluded only a "sale of all or substantially all of its assets to a
subsidiary or [affiliate].' 0 2 No cases were discovered which construe
these provisions in an AAPL operating agreement; however, most
states' corporate laws require shareholder approval if a corporation is
to sell "all or substantially all" of its assets. There are numerous decisions construing the "all or substantially all assets" language under
these laws and construing contracts containing the same phrase.10 3
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Tenneco, 925 S.W.2d at 646 (citations omitted).
See id. at 645.
See id. at 646.
See supra note 4.
See supra notes 2-3.
Consider the following cases:
Applying New York law, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982),
examined a provision in debentures which relieved the company from its
obligations on bonds if it transferred "all or substantially all" of its assets to
a successor if such successor assumed the obligations. See id. at 1044-45.
The court held that the sale did not constitute all or substantially all of the
company's assets where the assets represented 38% of the company's operating revenues, 13% of its profits, and 51% of the company's book value.
See id. at 1052. The court applied a purely quantitative test. See id. at 1051.
In Gimbel v. The Signal Co., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974), the Court of
Chancery of Delaware applied the Delaware shareholder approval statute.
See id. at 605 n.3. The court held that the sale did not constitute all or substantially all of the company's assets where the subsidiary that was sold represented 26% of the company's total assets, 41% of its net worth, and
generated only 15% of its revenues and earnings. See id. at 607.
Construing the Delaware shareholder approval statute, Katz v. Bregman,
431 A.2d 1274 (Del. Ch. 1981), held that the sale of a subsidiary did constitute a sale of all or substantially all of the company's assets where the subsid-
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F. Consequences of Breach
Both the seller and buyer are in the "target zone" for claims from
the preferential right holder if the preferential right provision is
breached. In Mobil Exploration & ProducingNorth America, Inc. v.
Graham Royalty Ltd.," ° applying Arkansas law, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the trial court's holding that both the buyer and seller were
jointly and severally liable to the holder of a preferential right created
under a model form operating agreement.1 "5 The buyer's liability
under the operating agreement arose from the assignment being made
subject to the operating agreement, but the opinion clearly states that
constructive notice of the operating agreement, however such notice
may be imparted, would make the buyer a party to the operating
agreement. 0 6 The appellate court, reversing the trial court, also held
that the purchase agreement obligated the seller to indemnify the
buyer for all liabilities resulting from the breach of the preferential
right provision.' 07 The seller had argued that provisions in the
purchase agreement obligating the buyer to satisfy itself regarding title allocated the risk of a breach of this nature to the buyer. 10 8 The
court held that the breach of the preferential right provision occurred
prior to closing of the sale and that provisions of the purchase agreement that allocated to seller all liabilities and damages arising before
the closing, together with a provision obligating seller to obtain waivers of preferential rights, caused the seller to owe indemnity obligations to the buyer.'0 9
The remedy sought by, and awarded to Mobil, which was seeking to
enforce the preferential right, was the transfer of the property and all
proceeds of production accruing since the closing to the extent those
proceeds exceeded the purchase price. 110
A wrongful attempt to exercise a preferential right exposed not
only the preferential right holder, but also the seller to claims in Abraiary represented more than 51% of the company's total assets, generated
45% of the company's net sales and accounted for 53% of the company's
pre-tax net operating income. See id. at 1276.
In Story v. Kennecott Copper Corp. 394 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1977), the New
York Supreme Court construed the New York shareholder statute to conclude that the sale of a subsidiary did not constitute a sale of all or substantially all of a company's assets where the subsidiary constituted 50% of the
company's consolidated assets, but over the last 9 years, the subsidiary had
accounted for only 1/3 of the company's revenues. See id. at 354.
104. 910 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1990).

105. See id. at 509.
106. See id. at 507.
107. See id. at 509.
108. See id. at 506.

109. See id. at 508.
110. See also Anderson v. Armour and Co., 473 P.2d 84 (Kan. 1970). In Anderson,
the preferential right holder recovered money damages equal to the difference between the fair market value of the tract as of the trial (without reference to improvements made since the sale) and fair market value as of the sale date. See id. at 89.
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ham Investment Co. v. Payne Ranch, Inc., ' discussed earlier. In that
case, the plaintiff was the jilted buyer who was deprived of the
purchase when the preferential right holder indicated he would match2
the all cash purchase price and other terms agreed to by the buyer."
After exercising the right, the preferential right holder successfully negotiated for seller financing. 11 3 The seller and the preferential right
holder, as joint defendants, argued in a summary judgment motion
that the buyer had no standing to sue since the buyer was not a party
or a third-party beneficiary to the agreement creating the preferential
right.1 14 The court sustained the buyer's standing to sue, pointing out
that the buyer was suing on the purchase agreement, which set up the
proper exercise of the preferential right as a condition subsequent that
would cause the purchase agreement to be no longer binding." 5 The
plaintiff recovered on its claim for specific performance of the
purchase agreement against the seller, the preferential right holder,
and the preferential right holder's lienholder."16
The plaintiff also alleged violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, fraud, trespass, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with
the purchase contract against the preferential right holder and his financial backers. 1 7 The appellate court held that the DPTA, fraud,
and trespass claims were waived by the plaintiff's failure to preserve
the arguments on appeal. 1 8 The court also held that the claims for
fact issues, and the
civil conspiracy and tortious interference raised
119
proceedings.
further
for
remanded
was
case
II.

MAINTENANCE OF UNIFORM INTEREST

The "maintenance of uniform interest" provision ("MUI") has been
included in the AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement since the
first published form in 1956 and is contained in VIII.D. of the 1989
AAPL form:
For the purpose of maintaining uniformity of ownership in the
Contract Area in the Oil and Gas Leases, Oil and Gas Interests,
wells, equipment and production covered by this agreement no
party shall sell, encumber, transfer or make other disposition of its
interest in the Oil and Gas Leases and Oil and Gas Interests embraced within the Contract Area or in wells, equipment and production unless such disposition covers either:
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

968
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, n.w.h.).
id. at 523.
id.
id.
id. at 524.
id. at 527.
id. at 522.
id. at 528.
id.
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1. the entire interest of the party in all Oil and Gas Leases, Oil

and Gas Interests, wells, equipment and production; or
2. an equal undivided percent of the party's present interest in all
Oil and Gas Leases, Oil and Gas120Interests, wells, equipment and
production in the Contract Area.
The MUI is arguably the most ignored provision in the operating
agreement. It is frequently breached, and the breaches, if noticed, are
typically tolerated by all parties to the operating agreement. The provision has evolved somewhat over the years, but the changes serve
primarily to clarify and reinforce the point that the provision really
means what it says and is to be taken seriously. Under the earlier
versions, it could be argued that the conveyance of an overriding royalty or net profits interest that did not alter the expense bearing percentages was permitted. However, the 1989 language clearly forbids
any "non-uniform" ownership of production.
The MUI has both a philosophical purpose and some incidental
practical "good housekeeping" type purposes. The "big picture" purpose is to protect the investment of the original risk takers by assuring
that all parties with rights under the operating agreement will be similarly situated and motivated. 12 1 Obviously, some co-owners will always be better capitalized than others, but at least, if the MUI is
enforced, each party will have in common the same (proportionate to
its interest) amount of sunk costs in the producing and proved nonproducing reserves and upside potential in the probable and possible
reserves. Most breaches of the MUI are results of separating the ownership of established production from the ownership of future drilling
opportunities.
The more practical hygiene-oriented purposes behind the MUI relate to the smooth functioning of the operating agreement. There are
various provisions in the operating agreement that are structured and
drafted based on the underlying assumption that the parties own uniform interests throughout the contract area. Deleting the MUI, or
tolerating breaches of the provision, can lead to disruptions under
other provisions in the operating agreement including:
Non-Consent Penalty: Without the MUI, a party faced with a proposal for the drilling of a new well can attempt to negotiate farmout
terms or other arrangements less harsh than the non-consent penalty provisions contained in the operating agreement.1 22 If a party
faced with such a proposal wants to retain its interest in the contract
area but does not want to participate in the new well, the MUI virtually precludes structuring any alternative transaction to the nonconsent penalty provisions. Protecting the right of consenting par120. See supra note 4.
121. See Roach, The Maintenance of Uniform Interest Provision: Are You at Risk?,
Sw. LEGAL FOUND., 39th Annual Institute for Professional Landmen (1998).
122. See supra note 4.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

21

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 5 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 4

214

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5

ties to receive the benefits of the non-consent penalty is part of the
purpose of the MUI.
Voting: The provisions regarding the voting to remove an operator
and elect a substitute operator assume that each voting party owns a
uniform percentage interest in the contract area. If those percentages are not uniform throughout the contract area, the operator
who resists removal may have a basis to challenge the votes.
Operator's Lien:12 3 The operator's and non-operator's lien are
more valuable if a uniform ownership interest in the contract area
secures all of each party's obligations.' 24 If the ownership of a drilling well can be separated from the ownership of established production in the contract area, there is no meaningful lien to secure the
obligations of a party with regard to the drilling well if it is not successful. Of course, payment problems are more likely on unsuccessful wells.
Areas of Mutual Interest: Although "area of mutual interest" provisions ("AMI's") are not part of the AAPL operating agreement,
they often are entered into in conjunction with a joint operating
agreement. If there is an AMI, unless the agreements that create
the non-uniform ownership interests in the contract area specifically
address the effect the transfer has on the AMI provisions, confusion
and disputes could arise. 1 25 Most AMI provisions assume that the
parties will share acquisitions within the mutual interest area on the
same percentages as they own the core contract area.
PreferentialRights: In much the same manner as non-uniform ownership can disrupt the operation of AMI provisions, they can have
adverse effects on preferential rights provisions. The preferential
right holders "share the purchased interest in the proportions that
the interest of each bears to the total interest of all purchasing parties." If the "total interests" of the parties are not uniform throughout the contract area, their relative rights with regard to exercising
preferential rights are uncertain.
One approach would be to say that no matter how fractionated
and non-uniform the ownership of the contract area is, each preferential right holder has the preferential right to acquire from the
seller the holder's proportionate share of each part of the contract
area where the holder owns an interest. However, if the contract
area has been "sliced and diced" with depth severances, reversionary interests and separate ownership well by well, in order for each
holder to exercise preferential rights, very specific and detailed allocations of purchase price among the various subparts of the contract
area will be required. Under some circumstances, one would expect
the breaches of the MUI to effectively invalidate the preferential
right.
123. See Conine, supra note 21, at 1328.
124. See supra note 4.
125. See Slawson Exploration Co. v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1479 (10th
Cir. 1996).
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Separate Storage: Differences in ownership from well to well or between producing horizons within a well, may require separate storage or other additional and otherwise unnecessary facilities.
Accounting Burden: Obviously, the accounting duties of the operator (and COPAS audits and the sharing of the costs of COPAS audits) are simpler if the ownership of the contract area is uniform.
The MUI serves valid purposes, and careful consideration should be
given before deleting it from the operating agreement or before waiving breaches of it by co-owners. However, it should not be viewed as
the last barricade against barbarian invasions. There are provisions
within the model form that cause "non-uniform" ownership of the
contract area and result in all of the problems enumerated above to
some degree. The non-consent penalty' 26 results in different ownership on a well-by-well basis. Likewise, the "abandonment of wells"
provisions' 27 afford elections to the parties that can result in different
ownership on a well-by-well basis. These provisions have very narrow
applications and result in relinquishments of interests by and among
the existing parties to the operating agreement (rather than transfers
to outsiders), but the non-uniform ownership that results from them
seems to be tolerated by the industry without significant complaint or
negative consequences.
III.

AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST

Simply stated, an "area of mutual interest" provision ("AMI") is an
agreement giving each party the right, but not the obligation, to share
in each of the other parties' acquisitions within the area covered by
the AMI. An AMI may be a small "buffer zone" around the edge of
the contract area covered by a joint operating agreement, or if agreed
to in anticipation of a large seismic shoot, it may be hundreds of
square miles in area.
AMIs yield two results, which are somewhat intertwined. First, the
AMI assures participants that the developmental opportunities in the
area will be owned by them in the same percentages as the initial risk
dollars are borne, preventing one of the participants from using the
jointly acquired data to acquire leases in the AMI for its sole account.
A second consequence of an AMI, which is not an entirely unexpected or undesired development, is that the AMI limits competition
in the acquisition of leases in the area. Once an AMI is established,
the parties do not compete against each other for acquisitions. This
cooperative behavior can contribute to keep the cost of leases lower
than it would be otherwise and also can allow the parties to acquire
acreage at a slower pace than otherwise. To the extent the acquisition
of leases can be deferred pending further geologic and geophysical
126. See supra note 4.
127. See id. at art. VI(E).
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evaluation, or until after evaluation of drilling results in the area, the
AMI also can keep the parties from buying unnecessary leases that
later will simply be allowed to expire. Of course, the "lower price/
slower pace" effect can be quickly reversed by one aggressive competitor who is not a party to the AMI.
Often the AMI serves an additional function for one party. For instance, if a party developed the geologic concept for a prospect and
acquired the initial leasehold position in the area, that party may reserve an overriding royalty from the interests conveyed to the participants who buy into the prospect. In this and similar instances, in
addition to affording all participants the opportunity to share in future
acquisitions, the AMI may also entitle the originator of the prospect
to receive without cost an overriding royalty in all such acquisitions.' 2 8
The AAPL forms do not contain an AMI provision, and new leases
taken within the contract area are not covered by the operating agreement unless they are renewal or replacement leases. 1 29 An unstated
assumption behind the operating agreement form is that the contract
area is fully leased. If this is not the case, an AMI covering at least the
contract area is probably desirable.
The case of Kincaid v. Western Operating Co.,13 ° although not a
Texas case, illustrates the need for an AMI if the contract area is not
fully leased.'
In Kincaid, the parties to the operating agreement had
all of Section 26 leased, but only an undivided 50% leasehold position
in Section 27.132 The Smith Interests owned the leases covering the
other 50% interest in Section 27.1 Two wells were drilled in Section
26 under the operating agreement, and one well was drilled in Section
27 with the parties to the operating agreement bearing 50% of the
costs and the Smith Interests bearing 50% of the costs.1 34 The contractual arrangement with the Smith Interests regarding the drilling of
the initial well was not discussed in the opinion, but it is clear that the
Smith Interests did not become parties to the operating agreement
executed by the litigants. After the drilling of the initial well in Section 27, Western Operating Company, the operator, acquired the 50%
working interest owned by the Smith Interests. 1 35 The non-operators
claimed that the operating agreement gave them the right to participate in the acquisition of this outstanding 50% interest. 3 6 The appel128. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982);
Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
129. See supra note 4.

130. 890 P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1994).
131. In fact, the need. for one was so manifest in Kincaid, the court just created one.
132. See id. at 251.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
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late court sustained this position by finding the operating agreement
to be ambiguous on the issue of whether it covered new acquisitions
within the contract area. 137 The court's determination regarding ambiguity was based on the parties' failure to properly complete Exhibit
A of the Standard Operating Agreement:
The Agreement provides that the following information shall be included in Exhibit A to the Agreement and incorporated as part of
the Agreement:

1) identification of lands subject to this agreement,
2) restrictions, if any, as to depths, formations, or substances,
3) percentages or fractional interests of parties to this agreement,
4) oil and gas leases and/or oil and gas interests subject to this
agreement, and

5) addresses of parties for notice purposes. Exhibit A to the
Agreement is deficient, however, as it provides only the information
asked for in subsections 1, 2, and 5. As a result, it is impossible to
determine, from the Agreement itself, what the oil and gas leases
and interests subject to the Agreement are. Consequently, we conclude that the Agreement is ambiguous in this respect."'
Presumably, if the parties had listed on Exhibit A the oil and gas
leases in Sections 26 and 27 owned by them as of the date of the operating agreement, the operating agreement would not have been ambiguous, and no AMI would have resulted. Of course, the finding of
ambiguity made relevant the extrinsic evidence admitted in the trial
court regarding the parties' intent and industry custom and practice.
That evidence and the, trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law are less than compelling. Even though the Kincaid case may not
be persuasive, it serves as a warning to be careful when completing
Exhibit A to the operating agreement.
Since there is no "model form" AMI, there are considerable variations in the language employed in these provisions. Some of the most
common issues that arise under AMIs are discussed below:
A.

What is covered?

Even though AMIs are typically entered into at a time when oil and
gas leases are being acquired, the language of the AMI is usually
broad enough to include almost any acquisition. Mineral fees,
farmouts and subleases usually are meant to be covered, since like a
lease acquisition, they are exploration opportunities. But is the acquisition of producing properties covered? What about overriding royalties? Typical AMI language will require a party to share any
acquisition, but if the issue is raised at the drafting stage, parties usually agree to exclude producing properties. The exclusionary language
137. See id. at 252.
138. Id. (emphasis added).
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should not be drafted too broadly, however, since "held by production" undeveloped acreage may be acquired together with a producing
well.

B.

Sufficiency of Land Descriptions

Frequently, maps with lines drawn on them are used to delineate
the boundaries of the AMI. Maps may or may not provide a sufficient
legal description-it simply depends on the map. The instrument,
taken as a whole, "must furnish within itself, or by reference to some
other existing writing, the means or data by which the particular land
. . may be identified with reasonable certainty."' 39 Small detailed
maps may be deficient in not identifying the survey in which the AMI
is located. 4 ° Larger scale maps are more likely to reflect survey
names and can suffice as a land description so long as the AMI boundaries coincide with survey lines or established tract boundaries. However, lines cutting across identified boundaries will not be locatable on
the ground unless course and distance for the interior boundary are
supplied. Whenever maps must be resorted to for use in describing
the AMI, consider addressing the possible deficiencies of the map in
the agreement. An example of a provision addressing this issue
follows:
There is hereby established an Area of Interest (the "Area of Interest") covering the area lying within the heavy dark lines shown on
the map attached hereto as Exhibit "1" and made a part hereof. It
is the intent of the parties hereto that the heavy dark lines lie on
survey, section or other governmental tract lines and that no partial
surveys, sections or governmental tracts be included in the Area of
Interest. If any portion of a survey is within the dark line, then all
of that survey is within the Area of Interest. If, after giving effect to
the foregoing provisions of this section, for any reason it becomes
unclear as to whether any tract of land lies within the Area of Interest, the parties intend the Area of Interest to be effective with respect to lands clearly within the Area of Interest.
*

C. Covenants Running with the Land
An AMI is of limited value if a party can transfer its ownership
position in an area free and clear of the AMI obligations, so most
AMIs expressly extend to "successors and assigns." However, in order to actually bind successors, a covenant must actually "run with the
land." For a covenant to run with the land, there must be privity of
estate between the parties to the agreement and the nature of the
agreement must "touch and concern the land."'' In Westland, Gulf
139. Wilson v. Fisher, 188 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. 1945).
140. See U.S. Enter., Inc. v. Dauley, 535 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. 1976).
141. See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982).
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and Superior acquired interests in three sections of land through assignments that were made subject to a prior unrecorded operating
agreement. The operating agreement, in turn, was made subject to
another unrecorded agreement that contained provisions similar to an
AMI. Unlike the typical AMI, which entitles a party to participate in
future acquisitions by paying a portion of the costs, the provision at
issue in Westland entitled the owner to an overriding royalty interest
without paying any contemporaneous consideration for it. The Westland decision held that Gulf and Superior had constructive notice of
the AMI, took subject to it, and
that the AMI obligations were cove1 42
nants running with the land.
The requirement that the AMI obligations must "touch and concern
the land" may leave one asking, "What land?" The very nature of an
AMI is to bind parties with respect to their future acquisitions of land
in which they currently own no interest. In order to constitute a covenant running with the land, the AMI provision must attach to real
property interests currently owned by the parties. Their successors in
interest in those real property interests will then be bound by the
AMI.
The AMI was not binding on successors in interest to the original
AMI parties in the case of Grimes v. Walsh & Watts, Inc.' 43 Grimes
illustrates the requirement that the AMI must attach to and burden an
existing real property interest. Mr. Grimes, the lessee under an oil
and gas lease covering 40 acres, executed a farmout agreement with
Lovelady.' 44 The farmout contained an "area of mutual interest" provision which provided to Grimes a 5% overriding royalty in the existing 40-acre lease and any additional leases acquired within the area
of interest. 145 Lovelady assigned an undivided interest in the farmout
agreement and the lease to Walsh & Watts, Inc., and the well was
drilled. 146 After the well was completed, downhole problems developed, production ceased, and the lease expired. 47 Walsh & Watts,
Inc. acquired a new lease from the lessor and recompleted the well as
a producer. 148 Grimes sued Walsh & Watts, Inc. claiming a 5% overriding royalty in the new lease. 149 Grimes asserted, among other
things, that the area of interest was a covenant running with the land,
and therefore, binding on Walsh & Watts, Inc.' 50 Grimes relied on the
142. See id. at 911.
143. 649 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. See id. at 726.
145. See id. This agreement provided as follows: "As to any given lease acquired by
you in the area during the period ending December 3, 1979, whether the lease
originates with you or me, there shall be set aside to me an overriding royalty of 5%
of production." Id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
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case of Westland Oil Developement Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.15 1 but the
court distinguished Westland:
In that case, the area of mutual interest covenant was held to run
with the land, the court finding that both privity of estate existed
and that the agreement touched and concerned the land.... Here,
we find no privy of estate. . . . In this case, there is no mutual or

successive relationship as to the property the Plaintiff seeks to burden. While there was such a relationship as to the original lease
earned by the farmout, that lease terminated and was released.
When the original lease terminated, the Plaintiff's overriding royalty
therein was lost. Plaintiff no longer owned any interest in the property ....

Thereafter, the Defendants secured a new lease which cre-

ated in them a new terminable fee in no way successive152to or in the
chain of title of any interest the Plaintiff ever owned.
The fact that Walsh & Watts, Inc. acquired an interest in the first
lease expressly subject to the terms of the Grimes-Lovelady farmout
and at that time was in privity of estate with Grimes did not create any
obligation on the part of Walsh & Watts, Inc. that would survive the
termination of the lease. In determining whether an AMI is a "covenant that runs with the land," one must identify the interests originally
burdened and remain focused on those burdened interests. If the burdened interests are oil and gas leaseholds, they may all terminate even
though the parties remain active in the area.
D. Mature AMIs
After the initial drilling phase passes, AMIs can become the source
of disputes and unintended consequences. In most instances, AMIs
serve their purpose if they have a term of five to eight years. Even if
no leases are owned initially, this length of term allows for the acquisition of seismic options, the exercise of the options, primary terms in
leases of at least three years, plus a generous cushion for renewals and
extensions of those leases.
Smooth operation of an AMI over any length of time requires a
"maintenance of uniform interest" provision to be in place. The litigation in Slawson Exploration Co. v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc.15 3 resulted
primarily as a result of uniform interests in the contract area of a joint
operating agreement not being maintained.' 5 4 In that case, Slawson
and Oryx executed a Participation/Area of Mutual Interest Agree1 55
ment contemporaneously with a model form operating agreement.
151. 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982).
152. Grimes, 649 S.W.2d at 728.
153. 78 F.3d 1479 (10th Cir. 1996).
154. The facts are developed more thoroughly in the District Court opinion, Slawson Exploration Co. v. Vintage PetroleumInc., No. 93-1212-PFK, 1994 WL 675017 (D.
Kan. Nov. 18, 1994), than in the Tenth Circuit opinion.
155. See id. at *1.
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The contract area specified in the operating agreement was not disclosed by either the District Court or Tenth Circuit opinions;
although, it was all within the AMI. The AMI covered all of Sections
9 and 10, T25N, R55W, Richland County, Montana. 156 Oryx acted as
operator for the drilling of the Tiller # 1-9 well, which was completed
in the Duperow formation within the contract area of the operating
agreement.157 Subsequently, Slawson sold to Vintage most of its producing properties, including the Tiller # 1-9 well and its 160-acre spacing unit. 58 Slawson retained undeveloped acreage within the contract
area in violation of the "maintenance of uniform interest" provisions
of the operating agreement. 59
Approximately two years after the sale to Vintage, the Tiller # 1-9
became uneconomic in the Duperow formation and was recompleted
in the Red River formation. 60 The Montana State Conservation
Agency assigned a 320-acre spacing unit to the Tiller # 1-9 well in the
Red River formation, and Oryx acquired additional leases within the
expanded spacing unit.' 61 Because these new leases were within the
AMI, Oryx initially offered Vintage the opportunity to participate in
the acquisition. 62 A subsequent title opinion revealed to Oryx that
Slawson had conveyed to Vintage only rights in and to the 160 acres
around the Tiller # 1-9, and Oryx requested that Vintage and Slawson
resolve the issue of which of them had the right under the AMI to
participate in the new lease acquisitions. 63 The lawsuit resulted.
Vintage argued that Slawson was precluded from retaining any interest under the AMI insofar as it covered the contract area of the
operating agreement by virtue of the MUI. 16' 4 While this argument is
acknowledged in the District Court opinion, 1651heM
the MUI argument
played no part in the Tenth Circuit opinion, which construed the assignment instrument from Slawson to Vintage to convey the right
under the AMI to participate in the new leases:
[The assignment] states that Slawson intended to assign Vintage the
"Leases" and "Land" listed in Exhibit A, which includes the Tiller #
1-9 well and its then 160-acre spacing unit, "together with identical

undivided interests in and to all the property and rights incident
thereto, including but not limited to all rights in, to and under all
agreements,
leases . . .and other instruments in any way related
166
thereto.'
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id. at *2.
id. at *3.
id.
id.

162. See id.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See id.
See Slawson, 78 F.3d at 1481.
See Slawson, 1994 WL 675017 at *4.
Slawson, 78 F.3d at 1482.
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The court held that the right to participate in the new leases under
the AMI was "related" to the Tiller # 1-9 well and that Slawson had
conveyed
to Vintage the AMI rights insofar as they related to that
16 7
well.

Typically, AMIs are ignored in assignments, as occurred in the assignment from Slawson to Vintage, leaving the respective rights of assignor and assignee uncertain. However, there is no reason
assignments cannot specifically address the allocation of AMI rights
between the assignor and assignee. To avoid finding themselves in the
position of Oryx in the Slawson case, parties to AMIs should consider
including an obligation to maintain uniform interests (much like the
MUI provision contained in the AAPL operating agreement quoted
earlier in this paper).168 In the alternative, parties to AMIs should
specifically address how the agreement will work after non-uniform
transfers. An example provision follows:
If a successor in interest to any party acquires an interest that is not
an equal undivided interest in the entire Area of Interest, that successor shall not be entitled to (i) separate notices from the Acquiring Party [party acquiring interests covered by AMI] under this
article, or (ii) separately exercise any option to acquire interests
under this article, but in all respects shall look solely to its immediate assignor to act on its behalf and protect its interests with regard
to future acquisitions and elections under this article.
IV.

CONSENTS TO ASSIGNMENT

169

As the preprinted "standard" oil and gas lease form increasingly
yields to word processor-generated lease forms, more "consents to assign" are brought into being. There seems to be a general consensus
that these provisions are enforceable, evidenced in part by their increasing number, but also by the writings of legal scholars.' 70 However, there are some Texas cases that should be evaluated as the
various consent provisions are interpreted. Consider the following examples of contract language (couched as if contained in an oil and gas
lease) that may be employed to create the consent requirement:
Item 1: "The rights of lessee shall not be assigned without the written
consent of lessor."
167. See id. at 1483.
168. See supra note 4.

169. The leases granted by the Minerals Management Service on federal lands and
by states and Indian tribes will typically contain these provisions, and for the most
part, the approval of these governmental bodies is ministerial in nature and is granted
after the transferee satisfies the bonding or other qualification requirements. This
paper will not address these governmental approvals.
170. MARTIN & KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW, § 402
(1997); cf. Pierce, An Analytical Approach to Drafting Assignments, 44 Sw. L.J. 943,

949 (1990) containing a discussion of some of the Texas cases referred to infra.
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Item 2: "The rights of lessee shall not be assigned without the written
consent of lessor, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld."
Item 3: "No conveyance or assignment of any of the rights granted to
lessee hereunder shall ever be made unless such conveyance or
assignment transfers all of the rights granted to lessee hereunder.
Any transfer of less than the entire interest of lessee shall result in
a forfeiture of all rights granted hereunder."
Item 4: "The rights of lessee are not assignable without the prior written
consent of lessor, and any attempted transfer without prior written
consent of lessor shall be void ab initio and without any effect."
Disregarding consent requirements like those set forth as item I and
item 2 above theoretically gives the party whose consent is required a
cause of action, but damages usually do not result from the breach of
the provision. "No harm, no foul" is usually the result of ignoring
these provisions. The language set forth in item I above is essentially
the language that was contained in the deed at issue in the case of
Haskins v. First City National Bank of Lufkin."' In Haskins, parents
conveyed a tract of land to their son, reserving to themselves a life
estate for the life of the last of them to die.' 72 They also reserved the
right to approve any subsequent sale of the land by their son during
their lives.17 3 After their deaths, the son could transfer freely. The
son granted a deed of trust lien, which was foreclosed by the
defendant bank while the parents were alive. 17 4 The restraint
language was construed by the court as a covenant which was
breached by the foreclosure. 1 75 However, the court held that the
parents' only available remedy would be a cause of action for breach
against their son. 1 76 The bank acquired the land free of the consent
requirement but subject to the outstanding life estate.' 7 7
The absence of damages also permitted the seller and buyer to
ignore the consent requirement with impunity in the case of Palmer v.
Liles.'7 8 In that case, the court reached the same conclusion as the
Haskins case under language virtually identical to item 2 above, except
the restraint was contained in instruments by and between co-owners
of the working interest in an oil and gas lease. One party to that
instrument conveyed a portion of its interest without seeking the
plaintiff co-owner's approval. 179 The court held that the transfer of
171. 698 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
172. See id. at 755.
173. See id. ("This convyenace [sic] is made subject, however, to the rights of
Vendors herein approving or disapproving any subsequent sale ... by said Vendee
during the life of the Vendors ...
174. See id.
175. See id. at 756.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 757.
178. 677 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
179. See id. at 663.
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the interest without the plaintiff's approval breached the agreement,
but that in order to recover, the plaintiff must show damages from the
transfer.18 ° However, the court concluded that the transfer of the
undivided interest in the properties from one co-owner to another
caused no damage to the plaintiff.18 1
The lessor or assignor whose consent is required for a transfer may

derive some benefit from the provision if the parties to the
contemplated transaction actually seek the consent.18
The commitment of the lessor or assignor contained in item 2 to not

unreasonably withhold consent has been construed as an enforceable
covenant, the breach of which could result in damages.183 However,
the prospective buyer does not have an action against one who
withholds consent, not being a party to the covenant.'84 Whether the
withholding of consent is reasonable is a fact question. 85

Consent provisions that establish forfeiture as a penalty for breach
generally will not be enforced. The language set forth as item 3 above

resembles the language contained in a deed conveying an undivided
one-half mineral interest in Outlaw v. Bowen. 18 6 The restriction
contained in the Outlaw deed was held to be void because "[t]here is
no enforceable penalty provided for in the event of violation of the
foregoing provision. ' The actual language contained in the Outlaw
deed was: " no conveyance or assignment of [the conveyed interest]
shall ever be made except in whole and that any attempt to convey or
assign any portion less than the whole thereof . . . shall operate to
forfeit the entire [interest] conveyed . . . herein, and any such
conveyance ... shall be null and void." 88 The deed says the penalty

for violating the provision is forfeiture, yet the court says the
180. See id. at 665.
181. See id. at 667.
182. In Mitchell's, Inc. v. Nelms, 454 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), the provision at issue was contained in a commercial real estate lease and
resembled item 2, including: "Lessor agrees not to unreasonably withhold his
consent." Id. at 811. The lessee requested approval of a sublease and the landlord
refused. See id. at 812. The sublease was not consummated, and the lessee sued for
damages. The landlord prevailed in a non-jury trial. The appellate court upheld the
judgment for the landlord, approving the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions
of law regarding the landlord's reasonableness. See id. at 815. The appellate court
made reference to various definitions of "reasonable" and "unreasonable," including
the definition supplied by Webster's Dictionary, but did not approve any specific
language that would necessarily be suitable for a jury instruction. See id. at 813-14.
183. See id. at 813.
184. See Oliver Resources PLC v. Int'l Fin. Corp., 62 F.3d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1995).
185. See Ridgeline, Inc. v. Crow-Gottesman-Shafer #1, 734 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1987, no writ).
186. 285 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
187. Id. at 283.
188. Id. Although the Outlaw case presents facts and circumstances very different
from those arising under a joint operating agreement, the resemblance of the
provision Mr. Outlaw drafted to an MUI provision is striking.
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instrument did not provide an "enforceable penalty."1'89 So, did the
court ignore the reference to the forfeiture or is the court being
extremely economical with its words, but clearly saying that the
forfeiture is not an enforceable penalty?
The Restatement of Property sets forth factors for evaluating the
reasonableness, and, therefore, enforceability, of forfeiture as a
consequence of a breach of a consent requirement:
(3) A forfeiture restraint imposed on an interest in property... is
valid if, and only if, under all the circumstances of the case, the restraint is found to be reasonable. The most common factors supporting such a finding are the following:
(a) The restraint is limited in duration;
(b) The restraint is limited to allow a substantial variety of
types of transfers to be employed;
(c) The restraint is limited as to the number of persons to
whom transfer is prohibited;
(d) The restraint is such that it tends to increase the value
of the property involved;
(e) The restraint is imposed upon an interest that is not
otherwise readily marketable; or
(f) The restraint is190imposed upon property that is not
readily marketable.
The consent requirements typically contained in oil and gas leases
and assignments of oil and gas leases do not grade out very well under
these factors. These consent requirements do not satisfy (a), (b) or (c)
since the restraints are perpetual and usually absolute and unqualified. Under (d), the consent may increase the value of the lessor's
interest, but not the property as a whole, and certainly not the encumbered interest. Factors (e) and (f) probably are not pertinent in view
of the heavy traffic in the transfer of producing and non-producing oil
and gas properties.
An automatic termination provision was not given effect in Knight
v. Chicago Corp. 9 1 in which the court reviewed the following language in an oil and gas lease:
In the event Lessee, its successors or assigns, should attempt to assign any undivided interests, overriding royalty or oil payment without the written consent of Lessors . . .this lease shall ipso facto
terminate as to the interests so assigned, as well as all of the remaining interest 92owned by the person or corporation making such
assignment.'
189. Id.
190. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF PROPERTY

§ 4.2 (1981).

191. 183 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1944), affid, 188 S.W.2d 564

(Tex. 1945).
192. Id. at 668.
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The court of civil appeals rejected the "ipso facto" concept and decided that a consent provision that makes the grantor's consent a precondition to an assignment will always be a condition subsequent
requiring a re-entry or a termination action by the grantor rather than
a limitation resulting in automatic reversion or forfeiture. 93 The
court of civil appeals also held that any restraint that purports to prohibit "attempts" or "offers" to sell is void for vagueness. 194
With the complications that attend the consent requirements and
forfeiture penalties, the lessor or assignor who wants to restrict assignability of an oil and gas lease may simply opt for the outright "nonassignability" of the lease by using language similar to item 4 of the
sample provisions set forth earlier. However, this approach also may
not yield the desired result. Item 4 is only a lawyer's rendition of the
language in the deed at issue in Soper v. Medford' 95 where the deed

provided that the conveyed land was "never to be sold or traded
off."' 196 The court held the provision void: "Since it was a conveyance

of the fee-simple title to the lots, the provision that they were 'never
to be sold or1' 97traded off' is repugnant to the grant and should be
disregarded.'
The black letter rule regarding restraints in conveyances of fee simple leads to the question of whether an oil and gas lease conveys a
"fee simple," the alienability of which cannot be restrained. No Texas
cases were found directly addressing the issue. 1 98 The oil and gas
lease has been characterized as a fee simple determinable or determinable fee. 19 9 On one hand, a fee simple determinable has all of the

attributes of a fee simple, except that it may terminate if the requisite
condition occurs." ° What distinguishes a fee simple determinable
from fee simple is not the character or extent of the rights of the
grantee during the term of conveyance, but rather is the possibility
that the term will not last forever. On the other hand, the interests
reserved by the lessor in an oil and gas lease, the royalty, and the
possibility of reverter are precisely what the lessor attempts to protect
193. See id. at 671. This holding by the court of civil appeals is not critical to the
resolution of the case under Knight v. Chicago Corp., 188 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1945).
194. See id.
195. 258 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1953, no writ).
196. Id. at 120-21.
197. Id. at 122.
198. Cases dealing with consent requirements and other restraints in real estate
leases should be given little, if any, weight, since oil and gas leases are not "leases."
See Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. 1982). Also, real
estate leases do not convey a fee simple determinable. See Reynolds v. McCullough,
739 S.W.2d 424, 432 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, writ denied).
199. See Cherokee Water Co., 641 S.W.2d at 525.
200. See Hanks v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 14 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1928) affd, 24 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. 1930).
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with the restraint on alienation. The legitimate purpose for the restraint has some appeal but may not validate it.2 '
V.

PERPETUITIES AND UNREASONABLE RESTRAINTS

Section 26 of Article I of the Constitution of Texas declares that
"[p]erpetuities . . .are contrary to the genius of a free government,
and shall never be allowed .... " The Constitution elaborates no further on the definition of a "perpetuity," leaving the courts to interpret
the common law.
The rule is stated as follows: "The Rule Against Perpetuities, at
common law, is that no interest within its scope is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being2 °2 at the creation of the interest ....,2o3
Preferential rights to purchase and AMIs give the respective right
holder the right to receive a future transfer of real property. Since it is
well established under Texas law that the life of oil and gas leases can
extend beyond the "lives in being plus 21 years" permitted by the
Rule Against Perpetuities,2 °4 both preferential rights and AMIs must
be examined in light of the Rule Against Perpetuities ("RAP"). Even
though both preferential rights and AMIs permit the right holder to
trigger a transfer at its option, the analysis under RAP is not identical
for both of them.
Preferential rights seem to be safe from attack under RAP in Texas.
They will not violate RAP and will not constitute unreasonable restraints on alienation so long as the holder has only the right to buy
the subject property on the same terms and conditions as a third party
has agreed to buy.2 °5 In Cherokee Water Co., the Texas Supreme
Court simply confirmed the holding and concurred without elaboration in the reasoning in the civil appeals decision on RAP and re201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.1 cmt. f (1981) ("The validity
of a disabling restraint is not established merely by demonstrating that the restraint is
imposed with the intention of achieving an objective that may be reasonably
justified.").
202. If RAP is applicable, the "life in being," the measuring life, must be a life that
is relevant to the interest being conveyed. It cannot be an arbitrary life chosen by the
contracting parties. Unless the Kennedy family is involved in the transaction, it cannot be "the survivor of all now living descendants of Joseph E. Kennedy, father of the
late President of the United States." If only corporations are involved in the transaction, and the life of no person can be identified as the measuring life, then the measuring period for perpetuities purposes is a flat twenty-one years. See Henderson v.
Moore, 190 S.W.2d 800, 801 (Tex. 1945); Jesse Dukeminier, A Modem Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CALIF. L. Rv. 1867, 1873 (1986); Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The
Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1648, 1651 (1985).
203. 70 C.J.S. Perpetuities§ 15 (1936), cited with approval in Kelly v. Womack, 268
S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. 1954). Editor's note: The court mistakenly cited to § 3.
204. See Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1982).
205. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. 1982).
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straint on alienation issues.2 °6 The civil appeals decision, Forderhause
v. Cherokee Water Co.,207 held that, without regard to the future vesting required by a preferential right to purchase, a preferential right
would not violate RAP because it was not an unreasonable restraint
on alienation. 20 The factors contributing to the preferential right not
constituting an unreasonable restraint on alienation are set forth in
the following excerpt:
The purchase right involved here does not constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation. There is no fixed price. There is no absolute option unlimited as to time. There is only the right,
exercisable whenever the owner desires to sell, to purchase the
property by meeting any bona fide offer. The holder of the right
cannot force or prevent a sale; neither can he fix the price for a sale.
In those circumstances there is not
20 9 such a restraint on alienation as
would violate our public policy.
The civil appeals court in the Forderhause decision cites no prior
authority or reasoning for substituting the "unreasonable restraint"
analysis for RAP analysis. This is somewhat surprising since the Texas
Supreme Court had earlier been emphatic in its clear demarcation between RAP and "restraint on alienation" analysis:
It seems to be the law in this jurisdiction that [RAP] has no relationship to restraints on alienation or so-called indestructible trusts. If
the deeds violate the rule against perpetuities they are void from the
beginning, but that is not true where alienation has merely been
210
restrained ....
The Restatement of Property concurs with the Forderhausedecision
that preferential rights do not constitute unreasonable restraints on
alienation. 211 However, the Restatement diverges ' with the
Forderhausecase on the RAP issue: "If the right of first refusal given
by preemptive provision is specifically enforceable in equity, the proproperty interest that is subject to the rule
vision creates a non-vested
' 2 12
perpetuities.
against
If the holder of the preferential right has the right to acquire the
property at a fixed price or at a percentage of the offered price for an
206. See id.

207. 623 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1981).
208. See id. at 439.
209. Id. (citations omitted).
210. Kelly v. Womack, 268 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. 1954) (citations omitted).
211. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.4 (1981). In Procter v.
Foxmeyer Drug Co., 884 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ), the court
approved the use of Restatement (Second) of Property in the analysis of commercial
transactions, as opposed to only "donative" transactions. See id. at 858. The Procter
opinion indicates that the Restatement rules on restraint on alienation can be used to
validate restrictions contained in commercial transactions, but not to invalidate them.
See id.

212.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
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indefinite period, then the right could constitute an unreasonable re214
straint on alienation. 213 However, in the case of Mattern v. Herzog,
the Texas Supreme Court upheld an option to exercise at a fixed price
that was not limited in duration.2 15 In Mattern, notwithstanding the
failure of the will that created the right to limit the duration of the
right, the court held that the right extended only for a reasonable
time. 216 The case of Garza v. Sun Oil Co. 21 7 involved an option that
was exercisable "at the expiration of 30 years 'or at any time thereafter"'2 1 8 In holding the option void under RAP, the court distinguished Mattern, which stated no time limit. 219 If an option has no
time limit, then under Mattern it is valid for a "reasonable" period.2 2 °
However, if it is intended to be unlimited, it is void.2 2 '
Most AMI provisions are limited in duration, and if limited to less
than 21 years, no perpetuities issues arise. If, however, an AMI provision that contemplates future transfers of leases is perpetual and if the
AMI provisions constitute covenants running with the land, then presumably they will violate RAP. There is at least one Texas case holding that an AMI provision which was not limited in duration did not
violate RAP, but this decision also held that the AMI provision did
not create an interest in real property.2 2 2 If an AMI provision
"touches and concerns the land" sufficiently to cause the obligations
to run with the land rather than constitute merely the personal obligation of the original parties, then the analysis used in Courseview is not
sound.
Under AMIs, like preferential rights, the party with the option must
match the "market price" established by a recent offer or sale. This
common feature provides encouragement that the factors considered
by the court in Forderhause to conclude that a preferential right was
not an unreasonable restraint on alienation (and therefore did not violate RAP) can be applied to AMIs and permit the conclusion that an
AMI will not violate RAP. However, one of the factors considered by
the Forderhause court as being relevant was that the holder of the
213. See Perritt Co. v. Mitchell, 663 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e).
214. 367 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1963).
215. See id. at 313.
216. See id. at 318.
217. 727 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
218. Id. at 117.
219. See id. (citing Mattern, 367 S.W.2d at 319).
220. See Mattern, 367 S.W.2d at 319.
221. See Garza,727 S.W.2d at 117. The Garza opinion also says that a 30-year term
for an option would be too long under RAP because an unborn heir could outlive all
lives in being and in that case it would be an unborn heir exercising the option in 30
years. See id. "By failing to either restrict the grant of the option to lives in being at
the time of the grant or to reduce the period ... to 21 years or less, the parties have
violated the rule against perpetuities." Id.
222. See Courseview, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 258 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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preferential right had "no right to compel a sale." 22 3 The owner of the
burdened interest could simply own and enjoy his property unaffected
by the preferential rights. Of course, the very nature of the typical
AMI arrangement is that the parties to the AMI do have the right to
compel a sale if a party to the AMI acquires an interest in the future
within the area covered by the AMI. The acquiring party must share
the acquisition by conveying interests to the AMI participants who
exercise their rights. For this reason, AMIs may not have the "safe
harbor" with regard to RAP that Forderhauseextends to preferential
rights.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion identifies the legal principles and at least
some of the relevant authority that may be helpful when analyzing the
four common provisions discussed in this article. However, also consider the following observations regarding the creation of these provisions in the future:
Preferential Rights to Purchase: Be circumspect about including
them in new agreements. When the properties are valuable and the
stakes are high, the preferential rights can be circumvented. In all
other instances, they are traps for the unwary. If the parties are
adamant in their desires to include a preferential right, consider limiting it in duration so that at least your client's error in judgment
will not live long after them.
Maintenance of Uniform Interest: It's good for you; don't delete it
and don't breach it. If the parties do not want the MUI provision in
the operating agreement, then they should consider having a separate operating agreement for each well bore.
Area of Mutual Interest: Take care to use legally sufficient land descriptions and consider limiting the term of AMIs to 10 years or less.
In any event, AMIs should be limited to 21 years or less.
Consents to Assign: Lessors love them. Lessees hate them. Instead
of restraining alienability, Lessors should consider addressing the
issue of performance by increasing the group of parties who are accountable for performance. Because of the uncertainty regarding
how consents to assign will be treated by the courts, lessors may get
more protection from language that provides that (i) no assignment
will relieve the original lessee from all obligations arising under the
lease both prior to and subsequent to any transfer by the lessee, and
(ii) each assignee of an interest in the lease shall become jointly and
severally liable for full performance with the original lessee and all
of the original lessee's successors in interest.

223. See Forderhause v. Cherokee Water Co., 623 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1981).
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